

Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) in automotive

May 22nd, 2025

Vincent Mailhol

Senior Product Security Engineer vincent.mailhol@woven.toyota

Meeting Agenda Software defined vehicle
GlobalPlatform Standard API
GlobalPlatform Properties
14
Security and performance
Trusted Platform Services (TPS)
26

About me

- Joined Woven by Toyota in October 2020
- Maintainer of the Linux kernel CAN subsystem (a.k.a Socket CAN)
- Member of GlobalPlatform ATF and TES working groups
- Member of the international standardization working group for the programming language C



01

Software defined vehicle

A story of reusability

Reusable Platform

TNGA: Toyota New Global Architecture

History

Physical platform that is used to build Toyota vehicles

- Accounts for 80%+ of all vehicles
- Defined variants
- Scales and is reusable

<u>**https://global.toyota/en/mobility/tnga/powertrain2018/feature/</u>

Reusable Platform

Electronic Platform

Software

Software platform that is used to build Toyota vehicles

- Defined variants
- Scales and is reusable
- Is certified

Reusable Platform

Common hardware components

ARM based chipset

Ideally Cortex-M or Cortex-A

Standardized APIs

Standardized security controls

Supplier agnostic builds

Known technology

Known supported features

Reusable software

Testable functionality and features

Provide reusable components for engineers

Provide capability for platform to scale and be independent (loosely coupled) with the hardware

Provide a known secure and safe foundation for developing functionality

Capability to separate out the configuration of the software from the operation of said software

Automotive Specific Items

01

Functional Safety

Our software **must not** have any failure that impacts the safety of the road user, or any person that could be impacted by the road user.

02

Long Lifespan and Quality

It is possible to fix an issue via OTA in modern automobiles, but the cost is high and some items require a service visit.

03


Performance

There are some scenarios, required for safety, security, or legislation that require specific actions to happen within a **defined amount** of time.

GlobalPlatform Standard API


A quick introduction

Classic automotive hardware security






Trusted Execution Environment



Same CPU

Trusted Execution Environment



Benefits of TEE with GP API

01Available by default on Armv8-A architectures. No additional module are needed. Cost Code reusable 02 Secure and normal operations run on the same CPU: less overhead communication cost. Speed CPU is usually faster than HSM. 03 No serial port: no hardware attacks on PCB traces. Security CPU/MCU **HSM** Serial port

03-1

GlobalPlatform Properties

Example with time:

Table 7-1: Values of the gpd.tee.systemTime.protectionLevel Property

Value	Meaning
100	System time based on REE-controlled timers. Can be tampered by the REE. The implementation SHALL still guarantee that the system time is monotonic, i.e. successive calls to TEE_GetSystemTime SHALL return increasing values of the system time.
1000	System time based on a TEE-controlled secure timer. The REE cannot interfere with the system time. It may still interfere with the scheduling of TEE tasks, but is not able to hide delays from a TA calling TEE_GetSystemTime.

Source: TEE Internal Core API Specification v1.3.1 §7 Time API

```
uint32 t system time procection level = 0;
TEE GetPropertyAsU32 (TEE PROSPSET TEE IMPLEMENTATION,
                     "qpd.tee.systemTime.protectionLevel",
                     &system time_procection_level);
switch (system time procection level) {
case 100:
        ERROR("Warning: REE-controlled timer");
        break:
case 1000:
        /* TEE-Controller timer: OK */
        break;
default:
        ERROR("Unknown system time protection level?!");
        break:
```

Code:

Other properties:

- gpd.tee.cryptography.*: check which cryptography algorithms are supported. Allow for crypto agility
- gpd.tee.trustedStorage.*: check the protection level of the secure storage


Idea: introduce new properties for the random generator:


- gpd.tee.rng.entropySource.protectionLevel: describe the entropy source
- gpd.tee.rng.nist: compliance to NIST SP 800-90 series
- gpd.tee.rng.bsi: compliance to AIS 20 and AIS 31
- ...

03-2


Security and performance

An example with REE ↔ TEE communication






The REE still has access to the buffer



Time of Check/Time of Use (ToC/ToU) vulnerability



Typical mitigation: local copy of the data

A balance between **Security**, **Performance** and **Complexity**?

Problem: Copying the data reduces performance

Solution: Some hardware provide some memory firewall

mechanisms

New Problem: how to balance priorities?

- Security? prevent ToC/ToU attacks
- Performance? zero copy
- Complexity? use of complex hardware mechanism + portability issue

GlobalPlatform TEE API Call Validation

```
typedef struct {
    uint32_t type;
    bool mayBeShared;
    size_t minSize;
    size_t maxSize; // 0=don't check
} TEE ParameterPolicy;
Set one flag: the implementation does the rest for you
```


- Security: prevents ToC/ToU attacks
- Performance: Zero copy if your hardware supports it
- Complexity: set one flag


Source: TEE API Call validation §4.1.1 TEE_ParameterPolicy

03-3


Trusted Platform Services (TPS)







Example Keystore



Trusted Platform Service benefits

01

Standardised services

Open standard:

- developed and reviewed by experts
- less internal effort

Competition between vendor

02

Maximise portability

The same application could run regardless if the device has a TEE, a secure element or nothing (example during development).

03

Service discovery

Flexibility: can query which services are available.



Thank you