

# Global Platform Use Cases

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#### **Vincent Mailhol**

Senior Product Security Engineer vincent.mailhol@woven.toyota

Meeting Agenda

Software define vehicle

Global Platform Standard API

How could reusability go wrong?

How to prevent failure

Global Platform Properties

Trusted Platform Services (TPS)

4

Global Platform Services (TPS)

## About me

- Joined Woven by Toyota in October 2020
- Maintainer of the CAN
   subsystem of the Linux kernel
   (a.k.a Socket CAN)





01

# Software define vehicle

A story of reusability

### Reusable Platform

## **TNGA: Toyota New Global Architecture**

## History

Physical platform that is used to build Toyota vehicles

- Accounts for 80%+ of all vehicles
- Defined variants
- Scales and is reusable

### Reusable Platform

## ePF: Toyota Electronic Platform

### Software

Software platform that is used to build Toyota vehicles

- Defined variants
- Scales and is reusable
- Is certified; no bespoke software

### Reusable Platform

Common hardware components

ARM based chipset

Ideally Cortex-M or Cortex-A

Standardized APIs

Standardized security controls

Supplier agnostic builds

Known technology

Known supported features

Reusable software

Testable functionality and features

Provide reusable components for engineers

Provide capability for platform to scale and be independent (loosely coupled) with the hardware

Provide a known secure and safe foundation for developing functionality

Capability to separate out the configuration of the software from the operation of said software

## Automotive Specific Items

01

**Functional Safety** 

Our software **must not** have any failure that impacts the safety of the road user, or any person that could be impacted by the road user.

02

Long Lifespan and Quality


It is possible to fix an issue via OTA in modern automobiles, but the cost is high and some items require a service visit. Toyota aims to support its vehicles in the field for **15-20** years.

03


Performance

There are some scenarios, required for safety, security, or legislation that require specific actions to happen within a **defined amount** of time.


# Global Platform Standard API



## **Classic automotive hardware security**




### **Trusted Execution Environment**



Same CPU

### **Trusted Execution Environment + Use of standard API**



Same CPU

## Benefits of TEE with GP API

01Available by default on Armv8-A architectures. No additional module are needed. Cost Code reusable 02 Secure and non secure operation runs on the same CPU: less overhead communication cost. Speed CPU is usually faster than HSM. 03 No serial port: more robust against hardware attacks. Security CPU/MCU **HSM** Serial port

# How could reusability go wrong?

Study case on Ariane 5

Failure in the Inertial Reference System (SRI)

Overflow on 16 bit integer

Consequences: \$370M loss



Ariane 5 launch (June 1996)


#### **SRI** developed for Ariane 4

#### No integration tests

#### SRI reused in Ariane 5



Ariane 4




Ariane 5

# How to prevent failure


Processes and testing

### Processes

- ISO 26262
- ISO 21434
- MISRA
- ...







05-1

# Global Platform Properties

## **Example with time:**

Table 7-1: Values of the gpd.tee.systemTime.protectionLevel Property

Value	Meaning
100	System time based on REE-controlled timers. Can be tampered by the REE.  The implementation SHALL still guarantee that the system time is monotonic, i.e. successive calls to TEE_GetSystemTime SHALL return increasing values of the system time.
1000	System time based on a TEE-controlled secure timer.  The REE cannot interfere with the system time. It may still interfere with the scheduling of TEE tasks, but is not able to hide delays from a TA calling TEE_GetSystemTime.

```
uint32 t system time procection level = 0;
TEE GetPropertyAsU32 (TEE PROSPSET TEE IMPLEMENTATION,
                     "qpd.tee.systemTime.protectionLevel",
                     &system time procection level);
switch (system time procection level) {
case 100:
        ERROR("Warning: REE-controlled timer");
        break:
case 1000:
        /* TEE-Controller timer: OK */
        break;
default:
        ERROR("Unknown system time protection level?!");
        break:
```

### Code:

## Other properties:


- gpd.tee.cryptography.\*: check which cryptography algorithms are supported. Allow for crypto agility
- gpd.tee.trustedStorage.\*: check the protection level of the secure storage


## Idea: introduce new properties for the random generator:

- gdp.tee.rng.prng: pseudo random generator
- gdp.tee.rng.trng: true random generator (unspecified)
- gpd.tee.rng.nist: compliance to NIST SP 800-90\*
- gpd.tee.rng.bsi: compliance to AIS 20 and AIS 31
- ...


## 05-2

# Trusted Platform Services (TPS)





## **Example Keystore**



## Trusted Platform Service benefits

01 Standardised services Open standard: less internal effort Competition between vendor

02

Maximise portability

The same use application could run regardless if the device has a TEE, a secure element or nothing (example during development).

03

Service discovery

Flexibility: can query which services are available.



# Thank you