



Oct 24/25th, 2024

Post Quantum Cryptography Update

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The Quantum Computer



QUBIT

BIT

*Classical
Computing*

0 ●

1 ●

QUBIT


*Quantum
Computing*




How Quantum Computer Impacts Cryptography?


CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM TARGETED	TYPE	PURPOSE	IMPACT FROM LARGE SCALE QC
RSA	Public key	Signatures, Key establishment	No longer secure
Digital Signature Algorithm		Signatures, Key exchange	
ECDSA (Elliptic Curve DSA)			
CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM TARGETED	TYPE	PURPOSE	IMPACT FROM LARGE SCALE QC
AES	Symmetric key	Encryption	e.g. longer keys needed
SHA-2, SHA-3	-----	Hash functions	e.g. larger output needed

Peter SHOR






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PQC predictions (2022)




PQC Predictions (2023)



2023 OPINION-BASED ESTIMATES OF THE CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY OF A DIGITAL QUANTUM COMPUTER ABLE TO BREAK RSA-2048 IN 24 HOURS, AS FUNCTION OF TIMEFRAME


Estimates of the cumulative probability of a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer in time: range between average of an optimistic (top value) or pessimistic (bottom value) interpretation of the estimates indicated by the respondents, and mid-point. [*Shaded grey area corresponds to the 25-year period, not considered in the questionnaire.]



Source : <https://globalriskinstitute.org/publication/2023-quantum-threat-timeline-report/>

The development of quantum computing

IBM Quantum



GIC Platform™

*Source: <https://www.ibm.com/quantum/technology>

The challenges facing current cryptography



The limitations of current cryptographic systems

Vulnerability to quantum attacks
Long-Term security concerns



The threat posed by quantum computers

Quantum supremacy
Risk of data breaches



The impact on security infrastructure


Re-evaluation of security protocols
Urgency of the transition

PQC: is it really a problem?

Yes.

- Finding the right solution can require significant effort.
- Migrating / deploying the solution is difficult and time-intensive.
- It is also urgent. There is a real risk today of “store now, decrypt later” attacks.

What is the solution?



What are the challenges of PQC migration?



Compatibility issues

- Legacy systems
- Interoperability

Performance concerns

- Computational overhead
- Resource constraints


Implementation complexities

- Algorithm selection
- Security assurance

Transition strategy

- Phased approach
- Training and awareness

Timeline



NIST Solution

Full PQC

Standard

- **ML-KEM - FIPS 203**: Published August 2024.
- **ML-DSA - FIPS 204**: Published August 2024.
- **SHL-DSA FIPS 205**: coming soon.

Additional round with remaining algorithms

New Round for Additional Round for Digital
Signature

PQC development challenges

- Availability of standardized PQC algorithm (e.g. : ML-KEM, ML-DSA ...)
- Replacing existing protocols such as Diffie Hellman to other mechanism (modify the exchange dynamic)
- Cryptography security strength vs the HW feasibility

Security strength / Crypto algos	Symm. Algos	Factoring (RSA)	DLP (DSA, DH)	ECC (ECDSA, ECDH)	Hash	ML-KEM	ML-DSA
≤ 80 bits	3DES 2 keys	1024	1024	160	SHA-1		
112 bits	3DES 3 keys	2048	2048	224	SHA-224		
128 bits	AES-128	3072	3072	256	SHA-256	ML-KEM-512	ML-DSA-44
192 bits	AES-192	7680	7680	384	SHA-384	ML-KEM-768	ML-DSA-65
256 bits	AES-256	15360	15360	512	SHA-512	ML-KEM-1024	ML-DSA-87

PQC migration into the existing infrastructure




CONSTRAINT OF
THE DEPLOYMENT



CRYPTOGRAPHY
AGILITY




REGULATION



USAGE OF THE
HYBRIDIZATION

Regulations Increase the complexity



EU required different security levels (than US) but some countries mandate the hybridization

Conclusions



CHALLENGE TO MIGRATE AND
DEPLOY SYSTEM ON THE
CURRENT INFRASTRUCTURE



CHALLENGE TO BE COMPLIANT
WITH THE REGULATION



TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENT
AND FEASIBILITY



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secure digital services
and devices

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