

# REALIZING SECURE BOOT ON AUTOMOTIVE DEVICES


DECEMBER 04, 2024  
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RENESAS ELECTRONICS CORPORATION



# INTRODUCTION

# A GROWING CHALLENGE

Million Lines of Code (MLoC) in Vehicles



# WHY SECURE BOOT?


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## Security Goal:

- Detect and prevent unauthorized code execution on boot
- Establish device root of trust


## Security Solution:

- Check code integrity and authenticity on startup
  - Protects the device against **unauthorized software execution and tampering**
- Support loading executable code **encrypted at rest**



# SECURE BOOT INTRODUCTION - HIGH LEVEL FLOW

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If secure boot fails sanctions could include:

- Disallowing access to cryptographic keys or peripherals,
- Resetting the CPU
- Executing a fallback or device recovery program.

# SECURE BOOT INTRODUCTION

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**Simple, right?**



# SECURE BOOT OVERVIEW


# SECURE BOOT OVERVIEW – WHAT IT LOOKS LIKE IN THEORY



Basic Secure Boot Example



# SECURE BOOT OVERVIEW – WHAT IT LOOKS LIKE IN PRACTICE



Example secure boot on multicore SoC

# SECURE BOOT OVERVIEW – HW ROOT OF TRUST PROPERTIES (1/2)

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## 1. Immutability

- **Definition:** The RoT must be unchangeable after manufacturing or initial configuration.
- **Why It Matters:** Prevents attackers from modifying the RoT to compromise the system.

## 2. Minimal scope

- **Definition:** The RoT should be small, containing only the essential code or functionality required for its role.
- **Why It Matters:** Reduces the attack surface and makes security verification more feasible.

## 3. Integrity/Authenticity

- **Definition:** The RoT must ensure that the code and data it protects is authentic and has not been altered.
- **Why It Matters:** Preserves trust in the system's boot process and secure operations.

## 4. Confidentiality

- **Definition:** The RoT must safeguard sensitive data, such as cryptographic keys, from unauthorized access.
- **Why It Matters:** Prevents data leaks that could compromise the trust chain.

# SECURE BOOT OVERVIEW – HW ROOT OF TRUST PROPERTIES (2/2)

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## 5. Tamper Resistance

- **Definition:** The RoT must be resistant to physical, side-channel, and software-based attacks.
- **Why It Matters:** Protects against sophisticated adversaries attempting to extract keys or modify RoT.

## 6. Lifecycle Management

- **Definition:** The RoT must support secure updates and revocation mechanisms when vulnerabilities are discovered.
- **Why It Matters:** Allows the system to adapt to new threats without compromising security.

## 7. Non-Circumventable

- **Definition:** The RoT must be designed so that it cannot be bypassed or overridden.
- **Why It Matters:** Guarantees that all processes depend on the RoT for establishing trust.


## 8. Anti-Rollback Protection

- **Definition:** The RoT must prevent the system from reverting to older, potentially vulnerable software versions.
- **Why It Matters:** Ensures system security is maintained even after updates.

# SECURE BOOT OVERVIEW – TECHNOLOGIES USED

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Often more than one of these technologies are chosen to establish the root of trust



# SECURE BOOT OVERVIEW – ESTABLISHING A ROOT OF TRUST (1/3)

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## Roots of Trust

- Immutable code established 'ground truth'
- Anchors boot integrity to hardware

### 1. Mask ROM

- **Description:** Read-only memory programmed into the chip at design time and used to store boot code or cryptographic functions.
- **Advantages:**
  - Highly tamper-resistant.
  - Ideal for storing trusted, unchangeable code.
- **Challenges:** Not updatable, so any vulnerabilities in the code are permanent. Requires a respin of the device if vulnerably discovered.

### 2. eFuses

- **Description:** Electrically programmable fuses used to store unique identifiers, cryptographic keys, or boot mode configurations.
- **Advantages:**
  - Can permanently store security-critical information.
  - Allows selective configuration of security features.
- **Challenges:** Irreversible programming and potential susceptibility to physical attacks.

# SECURE BOOT OVERVIEW – ESTABLISHING A ROOT OF TRUST (2/3)

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## 3. One-Time Programmable (OTP) Memory

- **Description:** Non-volatile storage medium that can only be written once.
- **Advantages:**
  - Permanently stores sensitive data.
  - Resistant to tampering since the data cannot be altered after initial programming.
  - Doesn't require a device respin.
- **Challenges:** May requires secure programming at manufacturing.

## 4. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs)

- **Description:** Uses inherent physical variations in semiconductor manufacturing to generate unique, device-specific cryptographic keys.
- **Advantages:**
  - Keys are derived only when needed and not stored permanently, reducing attack surfaces.
  - Resistant to cloning and tampering.
- **Challenges:** Requires sophisticated design and calibration.

# SECURE BOOT OVERVIEW – ESTABLISHING A ROOT OF TRUST (3/3)

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## 5. Cryptographic Accelerators

- **Description:** Hardware modules designed to perform cryptographic operations (e.g., encryption, decryption, hashing, and signature verification) efficiently, enhancing the performance and security of secure boot processes.
- **Advantages:**
  - Offloads computationally intensive tasks from the CPU, improving boot time and energy efficiency.
  - Provides strong protection against software-based attacks by isolating cryptographic operations in dedicated hardware.
- **Challenges:** Increases hardware complexity and cost and limited to the algorithms chosen at design time.




# SECURE BOOT CHALLENGES




**Why is this  
difficult?**

# SECURE BOOT CHALLENGES – MANY HARDWARE VARIATIONS


Examples of different automotive hardware architectures. Sometime multiple types on same ECU.




# SECURE BOOT CHALLENGES – BALANCING REQUIREMENTS




Key Management




Rollback Attacks



Performance Requirements



Sanctions



Multi-core / Multi-device



Policy

# SECURE BOOT CHALLENGES – ATTACK SURFACE

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Design  
Weakness

OR


Implementation  
Weakness

Software  
Weakness

OR


Hardware  
Weakness

# SECURE BOOT CHALLENGES – EXAMPLE ATTACKS ON BOOT




Timing side-channel allows recovery of decryption key

# SECURE BOOT CHALLENGES – EXAMPLE ATTACKS ON BOOT




Fault injection allows bypass of secure boot

# SECURE BOOT CHALLENGES – EXAMPLE ATTACKS ON BOOT



Buffer overflow allows bypass of secure boot

# SECURE BOOT CHALLENGES – EXAMPLE ATTACKS ON BOOT




Design allows for downgrade from RSA to SHA1





# WHAT COULD GLOBAL PLATFORM DO?

# BUT FROM BIRDS EYE... (IN ONE VEHICLE)



There is no rigorous regulation to specify

- Concrete (fixed) API
- Which cryptographic algorithm(s) to be used (more complex in PQC migration era)

# HOW CAN GLOBAL PLATFORM ADDRESS THESE ISSUES?

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- Designate secure boot as critical to Root of Trust function
- **Expand the Root of Trust requirements** to more explicitly define secure boot requirements
  - Cryptographic primitives
  - Immutable code requirements
  - Key management
- **Define the threat model and proposed mitigations**
  - Address threats like fault injection, replay attacks, tampering
  - Recommend mitigations or at least requirements around mitigations
- **Define boot policies and requirements** around reporting
- **Define performance and testing requirements** around secure boot



# KEY TAKEAWAYS

# KEY TAKEAWAYS

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- **Importance of Secure Boot:**

Detect and prevent unauthorized code execution during the boot process, establishing a device root of trust.

- **Root of Trust Properties:**

Must include immutability, minimal scope, integrity/authenticity, confidentiality, tamper resistance, lifecycle management, non-circumventable, and anti-rollback protection.

- **Challenges and Solutions:**

Address key security, rollback attacks, and performance requirements with mitigations like boot policies and secure update mechanisms.

- **GlobalPlatform's Role:**

Could GlobalPlatform standardize secure boot by defining requirements, threat models, and mitigations, ensuring consistent implementation across platforms?



Thank You

# VERSION HISTORY

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- 2024-12-03: Initial release